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ANTON PILLER ORDERS IN NIGERIA
E.S. Nwauche
Associate Professor o f Law, Departm ent o f Com m ercial Private and Property Law, R ivers State 
University o f Science and Technology, N igeria
INTRODUCTION
In this article I shall examine the principles that guide Nigerian courts in granting Anton 
Piller orders in the wake of the Court of Appeal decision in Akumci Industries Ltd v Aynmn 
Enterprises Limited.' This decision is significant because it is one given so far by an appellate 
court in Nigeria on the issue.
An Anton Piller order has been described as:
. . .  an injunctive remedy which is obtainable ex parte to facilitate the inspection of the 
premises of a suspected copyright infringer and the seizure of infringing copies or 
such relevant materials and documents which are vital to the prosecution of the 
plaintiff's case, but which could be destroyed by the defendant, if he had prior notice 
of litigation against him.1 2
It is to be noted that the definition above is correct except that it is used in other intellectual 
property cases.3 4Four years after the Anton Piller order was conceptualized in the case of 
Anton Piller KG V Manufacturing Process Ltd* Nigerian courts in the case of Ferodo Ltd V  
Unibras Stores5 6and Ferodo Ltd v West Germany & Trading Co Ltdhapplied the remedy. The 
order has received statutory recognition with respect to copyright issues by virtue of the 
Copyright Act.7 Section 22 of the Copyright Act provides that:
In any action for infringement of any right under this Act, where an ex parte application 
is made to the court, supported by an affidavit and there is reasonable cause for 
suspecting that there is in any house or premises any infringing copy or any plate, 
film or contrivance used or intended to be used for making infringing copies or capable 
of being used for the purpose of making copies or any other article, book or document 
by means of or in relation to which any infringement under this Act has been 
committed, the Court may issue an order upon such terms as it deems just, authorizing 
the applicant to enter the house or premises at any reasonable time of the day  
accompanied by a police officer not below the rank of an Assistant Superintendent of 
Police and (a) seize, detain, and preserve any such infringing copy or contrivance; (b) 
inspect all or any documents in the custody of the defendant relating to the action.
1. [1999] 13 NWLR (pt. 633) p. 68. Hereinafter referred to as Akuma Industries.
2. Ayo Oriola' Anton Piller Order As A Remedy for Copyright Infringements: A Martial Law in Disguise' 
(1999) Vol. 3 No. 3 Modern Practice Journal Of Finance And Investment Lazo, pp. 507-508. See Universal 
Thermosensors V Hibben [1992] RS.R 361.
3. For example Universal Thermosensors V  Hibben ibid ( breach of confidential information); Ferodo Ltd V 
Unibias Stores, Suit No. F H C /L /21 /80 ; (1980) FS.R489. ’ (registered trademarks).
4. 1976 Ch 55.
5. Note 3.
6. 1980 FHCLR 116.
7. Cap 86, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990.
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The application of the order has been fraught with controversy in its statutory and common 
law form. The controversy is with respect to the constitutional validity of the order and 
secondly the scope and application of the order.
Nigerian courts have questioned the constitutional validity of the order.8 So have learned 
commentators.9 10Their contention is that the Anton Piller order contravenes constitutionally 
guaranteed human rights such as the right to privacy. Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution, 
which provides for the right to privacy is of the tenor that: " The privacy of citizens, their 
homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby 
guaranteed and protected." The order is also said to be in breach of the right to fair hearing 
provided for by section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The said section provides that " In 
the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question or determination 
by or against any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing 
within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in 
such a manner as to secure its independence and impartiality."
The controversy on the scope and application of the order in Nigeria is well described by 
Balogun thus:
The scope and application of Anton Piller orders in Nigeria today is now so wide, that 
the plaintiffs are using these orders to close down defendants business. The service 
and execution of Anton Piller orders have become conclusive of litigation with few 
defendants having the enthusiasm to continue the fight. Instead of being a mere search 
and seize order, the Anton Piller in Nigeria has become a search, seizure and seal up 
order.11'
To examine the different heads of controversy outlined above, we shall now turn to the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Akinna Industries as the medium of analysis. As stated 
above, this judgement is important as it is so far the highest decision of Nigerian courts on 
the Anton Piller order and does indicate the position of the law.
THE COURT OF APPEAL DECISION IN AKUM A IN D USTRIES VA YM A N  
EN TERPRISES
InAkiuna Industries, the respondent/plaintiff sued the defendants/appellants seeking for 
a perpetual injunction restraining the latter from passing off their products, manufacturing, 
importing, selling or offering for sale their product and infringing their copyright in the 
product; delivery up for destruction all the products in question; an affidavit of disclosure; 
and damages for passing off their fake and counterfeit product as that of the plaintiff/ 
respondent. At the same time of filing the action, the respondent also filed a motion ex 
parte praying for several Anton Piller orders in terms similar to the claim on the writ of 
summons. The trial court granted the order and the respondent executed the order. Then 
defendants filed an application before the trial court to set aside the orders made and that
8. See the following cases Solignum Ltd V Rogers Adetola (1992) FHCLR 157; Rokana Industries PLC V 
Maun, (1993) FHCLR 243; Sony Kabushixi Kaisha VHahani A Co Ltd, Unreported suit No. FH C /L/35/ 
81.
9. See Stephen Kola-Balogun, 'Scope Application and Validity of Anton Piller Orders in Nigeria', Vol. 4 
1997 Modus International Lawand Buisness Quarterly 96.
10. Ibid, p. 100.
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the plaintiffs should return all the products and materials of the defendants seized when 
the Anton Piller order was executed. Their ground upon which relief was sought was that 
the plaintiff/respondent suppressed or concealed or did not state material facts, which 
would not have entitled to the order. The relevant facts concealed were that the respondents 
apologized for the use of the trade name of the products in question when he was confronted 
by the appellants on learning that the respondents had put a product by that name into the 
market. From the totality of evidence it is evident that both parties had applied to the 
Registrar of Trademarks to register their trade names. Their applications to register their 
trade names were both accepted by the Registrar but neither of them had obtained a 
certification of registration. It is also a fact that the application of the plaintiff was first in 
time. The learned trial judge refused to set aside the order. Whereupon, the defendants 
appealed to the Court of Appeal, alleging concealment of relevant facts. It is to that decision 
as they relate to the different heads of controversy that we now turn.
The Validity of the Anton Piller Order
In Akuma Industries the Court of Appeal held that the Anton Piller order is valid in Nigeria. 
In the opinion of Pats-Acholonu JCA who read the lead judgement of the Court:
. . .  the Anton Piller injunction by its very nature is ex facie subversive of the provision 
of section 33 of the former constitution but it is allowed by the Court in extreme cases 
having regard to the urgency of the situation."
In consequence therefore all the doubts about the validity of the order have been put to 
rest. For example, Oriola argued that:
. . . the constitutionality of this order is in doubt. Apparently it violates the right to 
privacy of peoples' homes and properties. Though section 41(b) justifies such a 
violation by a law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society for protecting 
the rights and freedom of other person, it is still debatable whether an order obtained 
ex parte to facilitate surprised search, seizure of properties and to extract information 
which could be used in subsequent criminal proceedings is reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.12
In Soligmun Ltd V Rogers Adetola,13 Sanyaolu J said:
The question which now arises is whether or not the decisions in Anton Piller and 
Ferodo cases will still apply today in our courts in the light of the provision contained 
in our constitution . . .  in Nigeria today, the right of fair hearing is a right which is 
entrenched in the Constitution and the legal effect of an entrenched provision of the 
constitution is that it overrides all contrary provisions in any law of the land be they 
substantive or be they adjectival.14
It is regrettable that the Court of Appeal is not very convincing in the summary manner in 
which the basis of the validity is declared. The constitutionality of the order was not firmly 
addressed. Perhaps it is possible to find further elaboration of the point being made by the
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Court of Appeal in the following cases which examine the constitutionality of ex parte 
orders for interim and interlocutory injunctions: Kotoye v C.B.N; i5 7-Up Bottling Co Ltd V 
Abiola & Sons (Nig) Ltd; 16 Provisional Liquidator Tapp Industries V Tapp Industries17 18920and 
Woluchem V Wokotna.lH Adio JSC in 7-Up Bottling Co Ltd v Abiola & Sons (Nig) Ltd clarifies 
the distinction in this way;
An interlocutory injunction cannot generally be granted without giving prior notice 
of the application to a respondent and the order cannot be made behind the respondent 
in view of the fact that the court has to decide many things before it can properly 
come to a conclusion on the question whether to grant or to refuse it. Further, and this 
is very important, a grant of an application for an interlocutory injunction without 
notice to the respondent or behind the respondent is void by virtue of the provisions 
of section 33(1) of the Constitution. An order of interim injunction is one granted to 
preserve the status quo and to last until a named date or definite date or until further 
order or pending the hearing and determination of a motion on notice. It is for a 
situation of real emergency to preserve and protect the rights of the parties from 
destruction by either of the parties. It merely leaves matters in status quo and the court 
does not at this stage have to decide any contentious issues before granting i t . . A
Uwais J.S.C (as he then was) was also of a similar opinion:
In both criminal and civil proceedings there are certain steps to be taken which are 
incidental or preliminary to the substantive case. Such steps include motions for 
directions, interim or interlocutory injunction. The time available for taking the steps 
may be too short or an emergency situation may have arisen. It therefore becomes 
necessary to take quick action in order to seek remedy for or arrest the situation. It is 
in respect of such cases that provisions are made in court rules to enable the party to 
be affected or likely to be affected to make ex parte applications. The orders to be made 
by the court, unlike final decisions, are temporary in nature, so that they do not 
determine the "civil rights and obligations" of the parties in the proceedings as 
envisaged by the constitution.211
It seems that this distinction effectively explains the basis of the Anton Piller order as being 
given in urgent, emergency situations to preserve the status quo of the parties as they go 
into hearing.
With respect to the contention that the Anton Piller order breaches the right to privacy, an 
answer can be found in section 45 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
which is a derogatory clause and sanctions the breach by any law, of many fundamental 
human rights including the right to privacy if the law is reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; 
or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons. This argument 
has found favour in other jurisdictions. In the case of Chappell V United Kingdom,2' the 
European Court of Human Rights evaluated article 8 of the European Convention on Human
15. (1989) 1 NWLR (pt. 98) 419.
16. [1995] 3 NWLR (pt. 383) 257.
17. [19951 5 NWLR (pt. 393) 9.
18. (1974) 3 S.C 153.
19. Note 16, p. 278.
20. Ibid, p. 282.
21. [1989] F.S.R 617.
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Rights, which is similar to section 45 of the 1999 Constitution. In that case, an Anton Piller 
order was obtained and executed against Mr Chappell who operated a video exchange 
club. Mr Chappell claimed that the order had been improperly obtained, served and 
executed. The High Court refused his claims and leave was refused to enable him appeal 
to the House of Lords. He then approached European Commission on Human Rights and 
contended that the order was in breach of article 8. The Commission found no violation of 
article 8. The European Court of Human Rights in turn upheld this finding. The Court 
concluded that an Anton Piller order is not in breach thereof because it contained adequate 
safeguards against arbitrary interference and abuse.
Conditions For the Grant of an Anton Piller Order
Ormrod L.J in Anton Piller V Manufacturing Processes22 laid down three conditions for the 
grant of the Anton Piller order, which Nigerian courts may be said to have adopted. They 
are: (i). there must be an extremely strong prima facie case; (ii). the damage, potential or 
actual must be very serious for the applicant; and (iii). there must be clear evidence that 
the defendants have in their possession incriminating documents or things, and that there 
is a strong possibility that they may destroy such material before any application inter 
partes can be made. A fourth condition seems to be laid down in Akuma Industries, which is 
that the party applying for the order must make a full and complete disclosure of the 
facts.23
A consideration of section 22(1) of the Copyright Act above shows that the grounds for the 
grant of the statutory Anton Piller is that principally there is reasonable cause for suspecting 
that devices used in copyright infringement exist in the premises sought to be searched. 
We shall now turn to a consideration of the cases to show how the courts have applied 
these conditions.
In Ferodo Limited V West Germany and Nigeria Trading Co Ltd.24The Federal High Court granted 
the Anton Piller order as sought on the ground that a strong prima facie case had been made 
out by the plaintiffs. The plaintiff were the suppliers of motor spare parts with the trademark 
'Ferodo' to Cornels Nig Ltd who were the sole distributors in Nigeria and which they had 
sold on a large scale for fifty years. Acting on a tip-off the sole distributors visited the 
defendants premises and purchased 10 cartons of goods that were similar to plaintiffs 
merchandise with the trade mark 'Ferodo' on the cartons and on the products. Their 
application was supported by three affidavits sworn to by the Sales Manager of the sole 
distributors; the patents agent of the group of companies of which plaintiffs are a constituent 
part and a director of the plaintiffs. In addition the infringing goods and the purchase 
receipt were also produced in evidence, as were the relevant registered trademarks in 
Nigeria. In granting the application, Tofowomo J said:
In an application of an interim injunction such as the present one, it is not necessary
for the plaintiff to make out a case on the merits as he would have had to do to obtain
22. Note 3.
23. See also the cases of Jeffrey Rogers Knitu’ear Productions Ltd v Vinola Knitwear Manufacturing Company 
[1985] F.S.R 184.
24. (1980) F.H.C.L.R 116.
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a perpetual injunction and it is sufficient if he establishes that a matter to be tried 
exists and the court may issue an interim order to maintain the status quo until the 
determination of the case.25 26
If the learned trial judge in Akuma Industries had demanded for the certificate of registration 
of trademark of the goods, it would have been clear to him on its non-production that the 
issues between the parties demand that the other party be put on notice. It was also 
regrettable that when the defendants/appellants sought to discharge the order, their 
affidavit should have disclosed that apart from non-disclosure of a material fact, no strong 
prima facie case had been made out by the plaintiff/respondent. Given the seriousness of 
the order, it is important that the courts demand for clear evidence of the existence of a 
right and the breach of that right. Any doubts should lead to the other party being put on 
notice.
There is not much evidence that other than the requirement of a strong prima facie case the 
conditions laid down in Anton Filler KG V Manufacturing Process Ltd play a significant role 
in the decision of the courts.
One of the grounds for the grant of the order is that the plaintiffs enter into an undertaking 
as to damages to indemnify the defendant in the event that the order should not have been 
granted in the first place.25
It is pertinent to note the provisions of Order 9 Rule 12(1) of the Federal High Court27 Civil 
Procedure Rules 2000, which provides that:
No order made ex parte shall last for more than 14 days after the affected party has 
applied for the order to be varied or discharged or last for another 14 days after tne 
application to vary or discharge it had been concluded.
Rule 12(2) further provides that:
if a motion to vary or discharge the ex parte order is not taken within 14 days of its 
being filed, the ex parte order shall automatically lapse. ;
The aforementioned rules apply to Anton Piller orders since they are obtained ex parte. The 
rules are a welcome' addition and will serve to check some of the abuses of the indiscriminate 
grant of the order.
The Nature of the Order
Nigerian courts seem to have forgotten the basis of Anton Piller orders and often grant 
orders that have nothing to do with obtaining evidence. For example in Akuma Industries, 
the learned trial judge granted the following order:
It is hereby ordered as follows:
(2) That the defendants/respondents and each of those upon whose behalf the 
defendants/respondents are sued whether acting by themselves, their servants,
25. Ibid at p. 120.
26. Columbia Picture Industries V Robinson, ibid.
27. The Federal High Court is endowed with exclusive jurisdiction by section 251(f) of the 1999 
Constitution to deal with intellectual property cases.
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agents, privies or otherwise however are hereby restrained from doing or 
authorizing the doing of the following acts or any of them; that is to say:
III. manufacturing, importing, selling, offering for sale, supplying or inviting 
offers to acquire or distribute for the purpose of sale, products purporting to 
be wigs and hair attachments bearing the trademark "Original Queens" or 
any other words so closely resembling the plaintiff/applicant's trademark 
and device "New Queen" applied for and accepted for registration in class 
26 . . .
IV. Passing-off or attempting to pass-off or causing, enabling or assisting others 
to pass-off products purporting to be wigs and hair attachments not of 
plaintiffs/applicants manufacture or merchandise as and for the goods of 
the plaintiffs/ applicants by the use or in connection therewith in the course 
of trade of the trademark "Original Queens" or adopting the Get-up, Logo,
Label identical in all essential details to that of the plaintiffs/applicant's "New 
Queens" or any colorable imitation thereof without duly distinguishing such 
Trademark, Get-up, Logo, or Label from that of plaintiff/applicant or by 
any other means.
V. Infringing the copyright in the Artistic work of the plaintiff/Applicant's 
Trademark "New Queen", its Get-up, Logo, Package and Distinctive Label.2*
The devastating effect of this order can be seen from the history of this case. The judgement 
of the Federal High Court refusing the application to discharge the order was delivered on 
the 28th of November 1996 and the appeal succeeded on the 18th of July 1999 — almost three 
years after.19 The order reproduced above could not have been intended to preserve any 
status quo or to obtain any evidence. It was simply granting plaintiffs the final orders sought 
without giving the other side the opportunity to challenge the plaintiff's assertions. Before 
the Court of Appeal discharged the order almost three years later, the business of the 
defendant/respondent lay prostrate. Imagine all those defendants that have no means of 
challenging an Anton Piller order and the hardship that has been caused thereby. Scott J in 
Columbia Picture Industries V Robinson28 930 clearly stated that the order should not be drawn 
beyond the purpose of preserving documents and articles, which might otherwise be 
destroyed or concealed. If this were adhered to, the orders like the ones given in Akuma 
Industries would not have been made.
Furthermore, the plaintiff should take enough copies of the infringing articles or 
contrivances needed for the prosecution of the case and return same to the defendant. If 
the items should be kept for the prosecution of the case, they should be in the custody of 
the court.
The Execution of an Anton Piller Order
The provisions of section 22 of the Copyright Act have influenced Nigerian courts in the 
prescription of the conditions for the execution of the Anton Piller order even in non­
copyright cases. Section 22 of the Copyright Act inter alia "permits the applicant to enter 
the house or premises at any reasonable time accompanied by a police officer not below
28. Note 1, pp. 79-80. See similar orders in the following cases: Dikkens Enterprises Ltd v Zukky International 
(Nig) Ltd, suit no. FHC/L/CS/318/2000, The Guardian (Nigeria), Wednesday, October 4, 2000, p. 69.
29. Emphasis mine.
30. [1986] F.S.R 367.
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the rank of an Assistant Superintendent of Police and (a) seize, detain and preserve any 
such infringing contrivance; (b) inspect all or any documents in the custody or under the 
control of the defendant relating to the action." Nigerian courts, now commonly prescribe 
the requirement that the order be executed in the presence of police officers.31 In addition 
all orders are to be executed in the presence of court bailiffs. The presence of the police 
officers is to ensure that the orders of the court are carried out to the letter. Whether their 
presence achieves this or not is a matter which needs to undergo further detailed 
investigation. However, given the militarised nature of the Nigerian society, it should not 
be surprising that police officers are added to underscore the seriousness of the order, 
ensure faster compliance and authenticate the validity of the order. The use of neutral 
solicitors in the execution of the order as is the case in England is attractive. However, it 
must be appreciated that the nature of the practice of law in Nigeria — where legal 
practitioners practise as solicitors and advocates — may make the use of legal practitioners 
more cumbersome. More serious is the observation that very few practitioners are 
conversant with intellectual property matters and therefore not able to be of serious 
assistance to the court. Whoever is used, it seems that the manner of execution is of 
importance. For example, Nigerian courts do not require that a detailed inventory of the 
items taken from the premises of the defendant be kept and filed in the court on the return 
date where service is to be reported to enable the court ascertain compliance with its order. 
The order obtained by the plaintiff/applicant in Eastman Kodak Company V Kodak Company32 
in paragraph 4 only required that the plaintiff's solicitor take the inventory. There was no 
requirement that it be filed in court. In Akunta Industries, the order stated that the goods 
and other articles found in the premises of the defendant were to be kept in the custody of 
the plaintiff/applicant.33
CONCLUSION
Having crossed the hurdle of validity, it seems that more needs to be done with respect to 
the conditions for the grant, the nature of, and the execution of Anton Piller orders in 
Nigeria. Since the Court of Appeal in Akuma Industries missed the opportunity to clarify 
these issues, it is necessary that at the earliest opportunity, an appellate court should do so. 
In the alternative, a practice direction by the Chief Justice of Nigeria in line with our 
discussions above will be in order.
31. See Nigerian Distilleries Limited VMega sea Distilleries Suit No. FH C /L/C S/142/98. Order reproduced 
in The Guardian (Nigeria) Saturday, March 27 1999, p. 18 and Eastman Kodak Company V Kodak Paints 
Limited, suit No. FHCV/L/CS/397/99. The order is reproduced in The Guardian (Nigeria) Friday 
May 7, 1999 p. 31. The former required only that four police officers attend the execution while the 
latter required only that a police officer not below the rank of sergeant be present. The Copyright Act 
requires a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police to be present.
32. Ibid.
33. N otel, p. 81.
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